Yossi Schwartz ISL (RCIT section in Israel/Occupied Palestine) 31.03.2026
Over three-quarters (78%–over 90%) of Jewish Israelis continue to support the war against Iran as of late March 2026, driven by perceptions of an existential threat. While overall support is high, “strong” support has declined from 74% in early March to 50% later in the month. Support among Arab Israelis is low, with only 19%.[i]
The global bourgeois American expert Pipe says that the United States and Israel are losing the war against Iran. His position reinforces our position of a revolutionary defeat to imperialism: the United States/Israel and revolutionary victory for Iran. Pipe says important things, but his weakness is his belief that Zionist and American imperialism will exist for many years.
Guy Rolnick, The Marke, who interviewed Robert Pipe, gives opening remarks and then asks questions and gets answers[ii]:
Robert Pipe, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and founder of the Chicago Security and Threat Project, explains why the rhetoric of victory hides a much more dangerous process: a gradual deterioration into a full-scale war, no exit plan, no strategic horizon — and with a real risk that Iran will emerge stronger from this conflict.
Five weeks into the war, it’s easy to understand why people get carried away by images of power. There are precise hits, there are assassinations, there are impressive capabilities, there is control of the sky, and there are moments when it may be possible to believe that the use of force will bend reality. But the question hovering over any war of this kind is not only whether the stronger side is capable of doing more harm, but whether it is getting closer to its political goals. Are more attacks from security battles, or are they pushing everyone deeper into a conflict that is becoming less and less controlled?
This is exactly the question that concerns Professor Robert Pipe, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and founder of the Chicago Security and Threats Project. For years, Pipe has been considered one of the most influential voices in the study of war, coercion, and terrorism. His book, Bombing to Win, challenged one of the fundamental beliefs of modern warfare: the idea that air power, alone, can force an enemy to change its behavior. According to Pipe, While aerial bombardments may produce tactical achievements, they often fail to achieve political goals, and sometimes even strengthen the determination of the other side.
According to Pape, Israel and the United States are nowhere near success if success means more security, more stability and more control. On the contrary: they become trapped in an “escalation trap” – a process in which each stage at first seems like a tactical achievement, but in practice produces a dangerous and irreversible change. In the interview, he explains why he sees the bombing of the Fordow site in June 2025 as a tactical achievement but not a strategic victory, why attacking leaders did not dismantle the Iranian regime, why Iran’s counter-response is changing the regional balance of power, and why he thinks the war is pushing Israel and the United States into a ground campaign.
It also points to a way out of the crisis: instead of power, diplomacy and the illusion of control, recognition of the limits of power. “Israel and the United States are not on a path that leads to success, that is, more security for the country, more stability for the economy and more protection for its citizens,” he says. “On the contrary. We go into an escalation trap in three stages, with each stage getting harder to exit. The first phase of the trap began with the successful American bombing of Fordow. The problem is that the enriched uranium at Fordow, which is enough to produce 10-16 nuclear bombs, was removed before the strike and is likely to have been dispersed, and certainly not completely destroyed.”
The enrichment facility at Fordow after the American attack in June. “From the moment you bombed it, you almost decreed the next step on yourself” Photo: Satellite image ?2025 Maxar Technologies / AFP
In other words, in your eyes, it was precisely the tactical success that created the conditions for the next stage?
“Exactly. Within eight months, they had entered a strategic panic. Why? Because they don’t have the International Atomic Energy Agency, the eyes and ears. There’s still intelligence, but as time goes by, you’re more afraid. And then, as far as the decision makers are concerned, there is supposedly only one military way: regime change. And this is the second stage in the trap: the transition from the bombing of capabilities to bombing to undermining the regime. When you try to carry out regime change using air power alone, it not only ‘quietly fails,’ but also creates a broad backlash. In this case, it comes in the form of horizontal escalation: drones, missiles, mines, and damage to the maritime spaces and energy routes.”
And in the meantime, hasn’t the Iranian regime collapsed?
“On the contrary, it has become more dangerous. With fewer internal restraints and a more rigid revolutionary character. At the same time, Iran is also stronger geoeconomically. If it effectively controls the passage of 20% of the world’s oil, it can also make billions from taxing the transit of ships. It’s already a catastrophic scenario, because you discover that you didn’t weaken your opponent — you helped him become dangerous, tough and have more levers of power.”
And what is the third stage?
“The land. I’m not saying that it was planned in advance, but just as there was a long preparation for the air campaign, so does the preparations for a ground campaign. It will probably start in a limited way, because they always say ‘limited’. But experience shows that ‘limited’ does not remain limited. It’s a logic of escalation. Therefore, what we have in front of us is not just a few more rounds, it is a dynamic that strengthens Iran, increases the chances that it will go all the way in the direction of nuclear weapons, and changes the balance of power to the detriment of Israel and the United States.”
Why is it difficult for decision makers to see the gap between tactical success and strategic failure?
“Because the tactics are better photographed. It is easy to show the public videos of injuries and assassinations. It is much more difficult to show a process in which the opponent adjusts, radicalizes his regime, learns your weaknesses, and begins to build new levers of power for himself. Politicians live in short cycles of time, armies are built to measure concrete achievements, the media loves decisive moments. But strategy is tested by whether you have improved your political situation. You can be operationally effective, and at the same time cause yourself deep harm.”
Why is the Strait of Hormuz and the energy market such a central component?
“Energy is power. Once Iran becomes a more decisive factor in the global oil transition, it doesn’t just ‘survive’ — it gains new influence and makes money. It can put pressure on the markets, and become a problem. If the air campaign ends in a reality in which Iran holds more cards in this area, then the opposite has happened to what they wanted to achieve.”
What would you say to policymakers in Washington?
“If Washington continues to measure success only in terms of hit, without asking what kind of regional system it is producing, it may find that it has pushed a close ally of its own down a more dangerous path, and that it itself is deeply immersed in the Middle East at the point where it wanted to reduce its commitment to it.”
“I’m not saying that there is no possibility of negotiations, but the space for that has been reduced. There are two ways to end something like this: through negotiations or on the battlefield. If we are trying to return to the table now, we must understand that the proposals that Iran had before the bombings began are no longer relevant. So Iran asked to keep the enriched material in its territory to a relatively low level, Trump said ‘no,’ and from that moment on we moved on to bombing.
“Now that Iran controls a major energy artery, makes money, and holds new advantages, it has no reason to give up just to ‘rescue’ Netanyahu and Trump. So, if you want to negotiate now, you’ll need to raise the price dramatically. It may begin with the lifting of oil sanctions — a move that the United States has already had to go toward to some extent, because it is also in its interest to prevent a wild jump in prices. But that’s far from enough.
“The really big thing will be Israel’s military restraint. If you ask Iran to give up such a large power, you have to offer it something in return. One can imagine a deal in which Israel joins the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). In other words, if there is inspection of Iran’s nuclear sites, there will also be supervision of Dimona. Israel will certainly oppose it, but for Iran, it may be an incentive, because it will give it a clearer picture of Israel’s nuclear capabilities.
“But even that may not be enough. Iran may demand an American commitment that if Israel attacks again on its territory, the United States will stop economic and military aid. It may also require a change in the deployment of U.S. forces in the region. These are already the kind of demands that are created after you get into a deep trap. I have never seen a country that voluntarily relinquishes power.”
Why do you think Trump and Netanyahu entered this war in the first place?
“In my opinion, the decisive explanation is the timing and dynamics of the escalation trap. From the moment you bombed Fordo, you almost decided to take the next step. At that moment I understood where things were going. And this also explains why Trump did not try to topple the regime with bombs in the past, even though he was pressured, while now he does, he has created the dynamic. I have seen the psychological process of leaders over and over again: they are shown impressive strike capability and precision, and within minutes they are already asking: ‘If so, is it also possible to kill the leader?’
What is the place of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states?
“There may also be a broader regional deal dimension here. When I followed Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, I saw an attempt to forge a barter: normalization and regional integration around Israel, and in return opening the door to building enormous economic and technological power, including in the field of artificial intelligence. This can be seen as part of the attempt to create a counter-coalition against Iran. But if Iran comes out with more power, it may also turn its energy toward the Saudis and the Emiratis. So I wouldn’t be surprised if Mohammed bin Salman tells Trump not to stop the war. He understands that his own political life is at stake.”
Do you see Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018 as the original mistake?
“Absolutely. This was a huge mistake, and mainly because there was no backup plan in case the move failed. I don’t rule out bold ideas, sometimes they succeed. Trump’s maximum economic pressure was a bold move: to take an agreement that worked at a certain level, tear it up, and replace it with something that might or might not work. But if you go for such a move, you must come with insurance. You must expect a backlash, expect failure, and prepare an alternative. Here there was no alternative, and the price is heavy. Iran, which at the time did not possess even a quarter of a bomb, pressed the pedal and returned to industrial enrichment. And suddenly you’re faced with a material that’s enough for 10-16 bombs, and maybe also for radiological uses.”
A radiological threat, that is, a combination of conventional explosives with radioactive materials, worries you more than the nuclear threat?
“In the next few months—yes. You don’t need a nuclear detonator to create a strategic trauma. You need radioactive material, a launch platform and a hit in a place like Tel Aviv. One such event is enough to profoundly change people’s sense of security, the economy, demographics, and people’s decisions about whether to stay or leave. In Israel, about 7 million Jews live in a region where some 500 million Muslims live, and since October 7 there have been signs of tens of thousands of Israelis emigrating. Now imagine a scenario of a radiological bomb in the heart of Gush Dan. This is a strategic danger of the highest order, and I would expect the Israeli defense establishment to think about it day and night.”
Did the Iranian leadership always want nuclear weapons, or was it pushed from the outside?
“We don’t have full access to what is happening within the leadership circles in Tehran, and I’m not sure that intelligence has a full picture either. When I look at the Supreme Leader, I see that he issued two fatwas (Muslim religious rulings) against the possession of nuclear weapons. I wouldn’t bet all my fortune on it, but it definitely served as a kind of guardrail. The more important point is what happened as a result of the policy of ‘beheading’. Many supporters of this approach tell themselves a simple story: we will kill the hawks, we will strengthen the doves. But I actually see the opposite result.
“The leadership that was removed was, in some ways, more restrained. Those who take her place tend to be tougher. Instead of putting away the day when Iran will have nuclear weapons, it is very possible that you have actually brought it closer. At the same time, you’re also teaching the whole world a dangerous lesson: ‘Look at North Korea. They don’t bomb it. Why? Because she has a bomb.’ The message is: If you have nuclear weapons, you’re better off — and it’s seeping not only into Iran, but also to other players in the region, and maybe Saudi Arabia as well.”
Are you actually saying that Israel’s hope of achieving security through more aggressiveness in Lebanon and on other fronts could produce the opposite?
“Yes. And not just because there is a limitation of size, resources, and burnout. People say: ‘What difference does it make if more Muslims are angry with Israel? After all, everyone hates us anyway.’ The question is what part of the 500 million people would actually be willing to fight and die. And if you act in a way that increases the number of recruits against you, you are causing yourself harm.
“Israel has a lot to lose. And the idea that nuclear weapons will ‘solve’ the problem is also not serious. Israel will not use it if it means self-harm. Therefore, the whole idea that you can just expand, extreme, deepen your anger and hope that the Force will sort everything out is a huge gamble without a backup plan.”
If so, what is your main message to the Israeli public?
“The only way out of this quagmire is diplomacy. It sounds almost outrageous in a moment of pain, anger and a sense of danger. But in historical and strategic terms, the alternative is much worse. Israel is simply not big enough to base long-term security on a war in a space of 500 million Muslims.
“If anyone thinks that 7 million Jews can win over time through war, conquer, control and decide, let him present a plan. That’s the real question: How do you live for a long time in such a sea? I don’t believe that the solution will be annihilation, and I don’t believe that the solution will be nuclear weapons. There is only one way left: stability and peace.”
Only six months ago, Israel was presented in Israel and around the world as a new regional power, and now you are describing a completely opposite reality.
“That’s right. That’s exactly the difference between rhetoric and reality. You can get carried away with a sense of superiority after images of victory, but in the end, like a balloon in the market, the moment comes when reality pierces the rhetoric. Strategic success is not how accurately you bomb this week, but what kind of reality you create in a year, in five years, and in a generation.”
The ISL as part of the RCIT, has taken our position in defense of Iran from the first day of the war. We call for a block of groups that support the position revolutionary defense of Iran, each with its own banners, inside the magnificent mass movement against the imperialist war.
We have observed that groups like the RCI and the Spartists are holding now, unlike in the past. positions in defense of Iran. It is clear that they adopt and tail the mass movement that oppose the war. Still the RCI calls to join them instead for an Anti-Imperialist United front. Alan Woods simply replaced his opportunism with a sectarian ultra left, the other side of opportunism. The Spartists added to their call to defend Iran to defend Cuba that in their imagination is still a deformed workers state [iii], while Cuba restored capitalism years ago. It should still be defended because it is a semi colony and not an imperialist like the US or China.
Endnotes:
[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/26/thursday-briefing-why-most-israelis-back-the-conflict-with-iran-even-as-international-support-wanes#:~:text=Good%20morning.,But%20first%2C%20the%20headlines.
[ii] https://www.haaretz.co.il/tmr/news/2026-03-31/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/0000019d-3d21-d3e8-a39f-7faf1d520000
[iii] https://dn721901.ca.archive.org/0/items/wv-1189/wv-1189.pdf