Yossi Schwartz, ISL (RCIT section in Israel/Occupied Palestine) 18.11.2026
In recent decades, there has been a strengthening of Israelization processes among Palestinian citizens of Israel, although the process is not uniform and does not cancel, but rather weakens, Palestinian identity. There is increasing integration into the economy as a middle class: doctors, engineers, lawyers, high-tech, pharmacists, university lecturers, judges, small and medium businesses, and more. This is reflected in the increasing use of Hebrew in daily life, studies, and employment, and the preference for the term ‘Israeli Arabs’ which has placed the term Palestinian citizens of Israel among some of the Palestinian citizens of Israel.
This is an incomplete process of Israelization, expressed in the demand to establish a mini-Palestinian state on 13% of Palestinian land alongside imperialist Israel on 87% .0f Palestine.
In the last elections, this trend was expressed in a historic jump in voter turnout. According to data from the Israel Democracy Institute published on November 1, 2026, voter turnout in Arab and Druze localities jumped to about 77%. This represents an increase of about 24 percentage points compared to the 2022 elections, and the highest level of participation recorded in the last three decades. Voters sought to directly influence pressing domestic issues, foremost among them the crime and violence crisis. The hope was that the only way to achieve personal security, budgets, and civil equality was to exhaust political power within the Knesset and vis-à-vis state institutions. Hope that the next government will shatter, since they will be required to pay the enormous costs of the war.
The process of Israelization was expressed in the last Knesset elections (2026) in several ways:
An increase in voting for the Ra’am party, which emphasized civil issues such as fighting crime, local authority budgets, employment, and housing, and placed less emphasis on the Palestinian national issue. Many researchers saw Ra’am’s success as an expression of a more pragmatic approach to integration into the Israeli political system.
An increase in the number of voters in the Joint List gave it more power to negotiate with a government led by Eisenkot to improve conditions and influence from within the Israeli system and be part of it, even though there is no chance it will support the establishment of a mini-Palestinian state, as Bantustans in South Africa during apartheid. However, the elections also showed the limitations of Israelization, as most Arab voters continued to vote for Arab parties rather than Zionist parties.
Support for the Ballad party, which emphasizes Palestinian national identity, indicates that a small portion of the Palestinian public who are citizens of the Zionist state still place Palestinian identity at the center.
The Joint List supports former Chief of Staff Eisenkot – hoping and under the illusion that this government will work to eradicate crime and violence phenomena, as well as to legislate a temporary order to freeze the demolition of buildings. The Eisenkot bloc voted for committee chairman candidate Roy Folkman, a man with a long anti-Palestinian history, and General Matan Kahana, a combat commander who participated in the killing of Palestinians in Gaza, told the Knesset Speaker, both from Eisenkot’s bloc. Before his election, the list demanded, as a condition, that he draft regulations prohibiting calling the list terror supporters, a demand he did not respond to, yet the list still supported his election.
So it is clear that the mobilization of Palestinian citizens of the State of Israel for the elections reflected a desire to integrate into decision-making centers and a clear trend of civic involvement and influence within the political system.
Both the leadership and the Arab public chose to use democratic tools under the illusion that they could shape the civil and political reality in Israel:
There is a limited similarity in the process of Jews from Arab countries—Israeli citizens who were brought to Israel as cheap labor and became a shaping force through Likud. But they are Zionists, and the cheap labor force is Palestinians from the West Bank and citizens of semi-colonial countries. Arab Jews accumulated political power, which they expressed by supporting Likud.
The illusion that the Palestinians, Israel’s citizens, would gain shaping political power reflects the process they underwent. With the establishment of the Zionist state, about 150,000 Palestinians remained in the Zionist state, and until the eve of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, they lived under military rule. On the eve of the 1967 occupation, the military government was removed to create a rift between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians who are citizens of the Zionist state. They were suspected by Palestinians from the West Bank that the Palestinians, citizens of the Zionist state, were collaborating with the Zionist government.
Under military rule (1948–1966), Arab citizens of the State of Israel became “water carriers and woodcutters.” The term describes the economic and class transformation Arab society underwent in the first decades of the state’s establishment, from land-owning peasants to manual laborers on the margins of the Israeli labor market.
The expression is taken from the Book of Joshua (chapter 9), where it describes the lowly status of the Gibeonites, who were enslaved to the people of Israel and performed the most difficult and simple physical labor, but unlike the case of the Arab Jews, all Zionists will oppose the accumulation of shaping political power of the Palestinians. Even those who want cooperation with the Arab parties, it is only as long as they are the horses the Liberal Zionists can ride on to achieve their goal of ethnic democracy.
