Yossi Schwartz, ISL (RCIT section in Israel/Occupied Palestine) 09.11.2026
The realization of Trump’s expected failure in the midterm elections, due to the American people’s opposition to the war in Iran, which led to a sharp price hike, before the idiot in the White House, two options are open. One is to blame Israel for its failure (as he has already done) and reach a diplomatic agreement with Iran, which is ready for an agreement but also for war, and the other is to make another round of war. It is difficult to know what this man, who changes his positions like another changes his socks, will do, since he has nothing to lose. Another round of war that does not topple the Iranian regime will encourage the masses around the world controlled by American imperialism to rise up. A diplomatic arrangement will leave Israel in a state of beaten dogs, standing alone against Iran, whose armament has improved, and it may receive modern air defense systems from Russia. Hezbollah is better equipped and ready to confront Israel. And Hamas has rebuilt its fighting organization.
In addition, Israel has lost a lot of money in the war, and Trump announced that he has cut the financial support for Israel. Facing a bad economic situation. Many Israelis with important skills are leaving, and the sanctions on Israel are growing.
And while both sides are “prepared for any scenario,” oil tankers are being hit in the Persian Gulf, and the Houthis are launching drones at key targets in Saudi Arabia, where the two largest airports are only partially operational. A diplomatic agreement would keep Iran as a regional power. Influential throughout Southwest Asia.
Trump says that business is business as usual and talks about regular quantities of oil coming out of the Gulf, but the reality is different. Insurance rates change every day and make it difficult to calculate costs; coordinating ship departures is cumbersome and makes it impossible to set timetables for oil supplies – and in countries that need oil, there is daily anxiety about what is to come.
Efforts to establish joint arrangements between various countries and Iran, such as last month’s meeting between the heads of the security forces of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey and the Iranian leadership, yielded no results. Saudi Arabia’s contacts with the Houthis, aimed at opening the Red Sea arena, also did not yield results.
In the United States, Trump is focusing on whether Iran will agree to open the Strait of Hormuz, stop the attacks, and return to a political settlement, but an equally important question remains: What will the regional arrangement be after the war? The opening of Hormuz will not dismantle the militias in Iraq, will not solve the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, and will not deprive the Houthis of the ability to close Bab al-Mandeb.
The Iraqi government led by Ali al-Zaidi has pledged to disarm the militias, according to an agreement it signed with the United States ahead of the withdrawal of US forces that ended on September 30. The agreement said the disarmament process would be completed in June 2027. But this is not possible because the pro-Iranian militias are stronger than the government.
Mujahid al-Assaf, who oversees security in the large militia Kataib Hezbollah, did not settle for a warning to al-Zaidi that he would not dare demand the militias surrender their weapons. He hurled a series of questions at the government about its economic and security policy, and attacked the oil deal with ADNOC from the United Arab Emirates. He said the government had sold the oil at a discounted price illegally.
He also said that the government holds $5 million that was donated to the militia because of its participation in attacks on Israel during the war in Gaza. This illustrates a reality in which a military organization that is supposed to be subordinate to the state puts the government on the defendants’ bench.
Ostensibly, the status of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq is similar to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, in contrast to Lebanon, in Iraq we are dealing with a large network of militias and not a central organization that challenges the government. These are militias that receive their budget from the state (in addition to funding and arming from Iran), and whose control over the state’s sources of income is much broader than that of Hezbollah.