Yossi Schwartz ISL (RCIT section in Israel/Occupied Palestine) 03.02.026
The Zionist pipe dream about a new Middle East based on the Abraham Accords has vaporized. The real development following the war on Gaza and the attack on Iran is very different. In early 2026, a significant geopolitical shift is underway as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey explore a trilateral defense framework, while Iran simultaneously navigates a complex “thawing” of relations with Riyadh.
Speculation has peaked regarding the formation of what some analysts call an “Islamic NATO”.
In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), a bilateral agreement under which an attack on one is treated as an attack on both. Reports from the Saudi military and Gulf officials have clarified that the pact will remain strictly bilateral between Riyadh and Islamabad. Despite the absence of a formal three-way agreement, the trio is deepening cooperation. Saudi Arabia: Provides financial clout and energy. Pakistan: Offers nuclear deterrence and a large standing army. Turkey contributes advanced defense technology (drones, naval vessels) and combat experience. While Saudi Arabia builds military ties with Pakistan and Turkey, it is pursuing a “soft” diplomatic approach with Iran to avoid direct conflict. Following high-level visits in 2025, including a visit by the Saudi Defense Minister to Tehran, both states have prioritized preventing a collapse of their relationship despite regional volatility. For a strained Iranian economy, Saudi Arabia is a critical gateway to breaking international isolation.
The “Islamic Army” Proposal: Iran recently proposed a broader “United Islamic Military Alliance” including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to counter external threats, though this remains in very early, conceptual stages.
However, there are obstacles to such a military formation, as Turkey remains a NATO member and must balance these new ties with its Western obligations. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has reportedly grown wary of the UAE’s regional initiatives, leading Riyadh to lean more toward the Turkey-Pakistan axis as a stabilizing alternative.
According to the INSS (The Institute for National Security Studies), a think tank affiliated with Tel Aviv University in Israel that conducts research and analysis on national security matters, including military and strategic affairs.: “Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman’s visit to Tehran in April and his meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, were intended to underscore and deepen the renewed relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the second anniversary of their restoration. The visit took place against the backdrop of talks between Iran and the United States aimed at reaching a nuclear agreement, along with reports of a possible Israeli and/or American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Although both Saudi Arabia and Iran have an interest in preserving and strengthening their ties, Riyadh is particularly eager to distance itself from any regional conflict that could also harm it—hence its efforts to tighten relations with Iran.
On April 17, amid the renewed nuclear talks between Iran and the United States and reports of Israeli intentions to strike Iran’s nuclear sites, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman visited Iran and met with Supreme Leader Khamenei. This visit marked a significant milestone in Saudi–Iranian relations: It was the first time since 2006 that a senior Saudi official had met with Iran’s supreme leader. Khalid—brother of the Saudi crown prince and the kingdom’s de facto ruler—reportedly delivered a letter (contents undisclosed) from King Salman, his father. The visit underscored both countries’ desire to reaffirm their commitment to the 2023 agreement that renewed their diplomatic ties.
It was Saudi Arabia that pushed for the renewal of relations with Iran amid a broader shift in Riyadh’s foreign policy, which extends beyond the Iranian issue. In his first three years as de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman’s actions—both domestically and regionally—were widely seen as “reckless and adventurous.” However, he has gradually adopted a more restrained foreign policy, similar to the kingdom’s stance prior to his elevation. Currently, Saudi Arabia prioritizes diplomacy over armed conflict, seeking to focus on socioeconomic modernization and attract necessary investments—goals that require security and stability, especially in relation to regional rivals and enemies.” [i]
Soufan (a global intelligence and security consultancy that helps clients in the public and private sectors enhance their ability to identify and assess national and international challenges) reports that Türkiye’s interest in forming close relations with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is clear: “Türkiye’s rationale for wanting the three-part alliance is clear. A Bloomberg report quoted sources familiar with the matter, saying Türkiye had sought to join the earlier Pakistan-Saudi defense agreement, viewing it “as a way of strengthening security and deterrence when there are questions over the reliability of the U.S., which has strong military ties with all three countries, and President Donald Trump’s commitment to [NATO].” Bloomberg also quoted Nihat Ali Ozcan, a strategist with Ankara-based think tank TEPAV, as explaining: “Saudi Arabia brings financial clout, Pakistan has nuclear capability, ballistic missiles and manpower, while Türkiye has military experience and has developed a defense industry.” Yet lingering distrust between Erdogan and MBS could derail the agreement. Last week, Fidan explained that talks had been held on a Saudi-Pakistan-Türkiye accord but that no agreement had yet been signed. Fidan pointed to a need for broader regional cooperation and for “trust to overcome distrust.” He added, “At the moment, there are meetings, talks, but we have not signed any agreement. Our President’s vision is for an inclusive platform that creates wider, bigger cooperation and stability.”[ii]
The INSS also reports: “Moreover, even as Tehran continues to supply military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been very cautious not to violate the agreement and continues its “soft” approach toward the Houthis, who are now considered leaders in the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” as long as the Houthis themselves uphold the agreement. Given that Saudi Arabia holds a central position in the Sunni world, its rapprochement with Iran gives other Sunni states a “green light” to deepen their ties with Tehran. Saudi Arabia has also allowed Iran to bolster its status within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), headquartered in the kingdom.
The Saudi Defense Minister’s visit to Iran signals to Tehran Riyadh’s desire not to be seen as linked in any way to military threats against Iran and to stress that, if and when Iran is attacked, Saudi Arabia intends to stay out of it”[iii].
These new developments may explain why Israel and the US have not attacked Iran so far and why Trump hesitates and prefers a new agreement with Iran over its nuclear energy project. At the same time, Hamas is worried as Turkey is putting pressure on Hamas to disarm.
“Germany’s foreign minister says Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, and other Arab states are exerting pressure on Hamas in Gaza to disarm to support further peace negotiations with Israel. All these states don’t want Hamas to continue to be active. They want disarmament, and in this respect, we have a good pressure scenario, because it won’t work without pressure,” Minister Johann Wadephul tells Deutschlandfunk radio [iv].
It is not difficult to understand why the Zionists are not happy with this development of the region.
Endnotes:
[i] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-saudi-arabia-2025/#:~:text=Moreover%2C%20even%20as%20Tehran%20continues,to%20stay%20out%20of%20it.
[ii] https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-29/#:~:text=And%20this%20agreement%20has%20been,%2C%20bigger%20cooperation%20and%20stability.%E2%80%9D
[iii] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-saudi-arabia-2025/#:~:text=Moreover%2C%20even%20as%20Tehran%20continues,to%20stay%20out%20of%20it.
[iv] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/arab-states-and-turkey-pressuring-hamas-to-disarm-germany-says/