Yossi Schwartz ISL (RCIT section in Israel/ Occupied Palestine) 25.06.2026
Vice President J.D. Vance is in charge of negotiations with Iran and is asked to prove victory. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was not an active participant in the discussions in Geneva, is trying to persuade the Gulf states to give a lost trust between the Gulf states and the United States. In this framework, Israel has the status of a mere spectator, whose participation has been forced upon it, and all it can do is try to sabotage the deal and hope that it will succeed in stopping the understanding.
Rubio’s visit this week to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain — the first since the outbreak of the Gulf war — to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman is not a poor attempt to ensure continued military cooperation and to convince them that the United States does not intend to use a “soft hand” in its dealings with Iran. But these countries have a great deal of distrust. Because while Rubio explains that the United States will vehemently oppose Iran’s conditions for free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and Trump declares from Washington that Iran has pledged not to charge transit fees and even threatens to halt negotiations if this agreement is violated, Iran is doing as it pleases.
In an Omani-Iranian statement, the two countries announced the establishment of a “joint working group” to discuss the future management of traffic in the Strait. Iran strengthens its position in Lebanon is used to dictate a new regional order instead of the Abraham Accords.
According to Tehran, it has committed not to collect transit fees, but only during the 60 days of negotiations.
Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani landed in Oman on Wednesday to promote the establishment of a joint negotiating group for Iran and the Gulf states. It intends to discuss the issue of the passage through Hormuz, joint coordination of the cruise, and the issue of collecting fees for services. This already appears to be an independent Gulf initiative that has nothing to do with negotiations between the United States and Iran, and which relies on the assessment that the United States will not be able to bend Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. Secondly, which stems from it, argues that it would be better for the Gulf states to reach an agreement with Iran early before Trump himself offers concessions that could give Iran complete control over the Strait passage.
These two assumptions indicate not only a crisis of confidence in the U.S.’s ability to negotiate effectively with Iran, but also the urgent need to formulate an independent Gulf policy that sees Iran as a necessary partner, and not just on the issue of Gulf navigation. Thus, for example, the Gulf states, and especially Saudi Arabia, will be required to coordinate with Iran on the issue of oil marketing, after the temporary lifting of US sanctions. Examine the question of the establishment of a $300 billion “rehabilitation fund” promised to Iran, and even before that, the issue of releasing the $12 billion (out of $24 billion) frozen in banks around the world.
It is important to mention that many Iranian funds are deposited in the Gulf states. In Qatar, it is about $6 billion. Iraq holds between $10 billion and $15 billion that it owes the Iranians for electricity and gas, and several billion dollars are also deposited in banks in the United Arab Emirates. The dispute over the release of the first $12 billion is in fact the first test of the United States’ “steadfastness” on the implementation of the memorandum of understanding. As far as Iran is concerned, the release of an initial sum is proof of the seriousness of the United States.
Although the Gulf states are not independent to decide whether to release Iranian funds, if a parallel mechanism of negotiations is established between the Gulf states and Iran, it will try to formulate new rules of the game not only around the management of the Gulf but also about the overall future relationship between Iran and the Gulf states.
This position, which sees Iran as an equal to the Gulf states, provides Tehran with political leverage that it is expected to exploit in negotiations with the United States. Paradoxically, the countries that have suffered the hardest blows at the hands of Iran are liable to return to the role they had before the war: a political and economic envelope that will enable Iran to withstand pressure and threats from the United States.
Rubio will seek to convince the Gulf states that the United States is still capable of establishing a regional security system and that negotiations with Iran do not come at the expense of the interests of Washington’s allies. However, it is liable to face a new reality in which it is the Gulf states that will open the separate track. In this context, the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon also take on broader significance. Rubio made sure to emphasize that Washington would speak directly with the sovereign Lebanese government on the issues between it and Israel, separate from the framework of the United States vis-à-vis Iran, but in practice the various arenas are connected and Hamas now wants to be part of the new arrangement in the region. It has already been said that the winner has many partners, the defeated has no friends. This is only one result of the defeat of American and Zionist imperialism. We will see many more and by the working class and the oppressed.